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CARRIERS; EXCEPTIONS IN BILL OF LADING. In Fairbanks
Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. R. Ry., 8I Fed. 289 (Ohio), (May
17, 1897), it was held that a common carrier's exemption from lia-
bility for loss from "accidents to boiler and machinery" did not.
cover the case of a broken axle.
It is well settled that exemptions in favor of a common carrier iii
bills of lading are to be strictly construed against the carrier, and
that any doubt or ambiguity therein is to be resolved in favor of the.
shipper: Blackv. Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 319; 13 N. W. 244;
Railway Co. v. Talbot, 39 Ark. 524; Norman v. Binningion, 25
Q. B. D. 475,477; Taylorv. Steam Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 546, 549;
Burton v. English, 12 Q. B. D. 218, 224; Cream City R. R. Co.
v. Chi., Af &- St. P. Ry. Co., 63 Wis. 93; 23 N. W. 425
"And when the particular dangers or risks against which the car-
rier has specifically guardecPhimself in his receipt are followed by
more general and comprehensive words of exemption, the latter are
to be construed to embrace only occurrences ejusdem generis with
those previously enumerated, unless there be a clear intent to the
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contrary :" Hutch. Carr. §§ 275, 276; Hawkins v. Railway Co.,
17 Mich. 57; The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124; 15 Sup. Ct. 537.
Light is thrown on the meaning of the phrase "accidents
to boiler and machinery," when we note that the bill of lading
applies to carriage by sea and land. The juxtaposition of the words
"boiler" and "machinery" shows that machinery refers to the
group of mechanical parts connected with the boiler and steam sup-
ply by which power is generated and applied and the vessel is
propelled through the water. The term must have the same limi-
tations when applied to a train of cars. Hence "machinery only
includes the mechanical instrumentalities present in the locomotive
or directly connected therewith and necessary for the propulsion of
the train. An axle of a car certainly cannot be included within
the term.
Judgment in court below for defendant reversed, and new trial
ordered.
TAXATION; EXEMPTION OF RAILROAD PROPERTY. It has been
said that property, indispensably necessary to the operation of a
railroad, is exempt from taxation in the absence of any provision
contained in the charter of the corporation. Applying this test,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held-reversing the decree of
the court below-repair shops of a railroad used exclusively for
repairs, and in which no new stock was built, exempt from local
taxation: Western N. Y and Pennsylvania Railway Co. v. County
of Venango, 5 Pa. Superior Ct. R. 304 (July 23, 1897).
The reasoning by which the court arrived at this conclusion is
indicated by the following excerpt from the opinion of Mr. Justice -
Orlady. "Public policy requires that everything which tends to
increase the danger of travel upon railroads should be prevented.
The propelling power used in hauling the numerous freight and pas-
senger trains at a high rate of speed; the responsibility for safe road-
bed, engines, and cars, require that the railroad company shall have
as means to meet these responsibilities, and to discharge these duties,
the fullest opportunities with the freest use which is deemed necessary
to the safe management of the road. Given an engine or car de-
railed, or parts of an engine or car broken, then repair shops as such,
and storage-houses for duplicate parts of engines and cars, neces-
sary machinery and appliances, become as indispensably necessary
to the proper exercise of the corporate franchises of the railroad
company, in the discharge of their duty to the public, as are pas-
senger, freight, and water stations, tanks, and tool-houses along the
line of their roads:" Schuylkill Bridge Co. v. Frailey, I3 S. & R.
(Pa.) 422 (1825); Worcester v. Western R. R. Co., 4 Met.
(Mass.) 564 (1842); R. R. v. Berks County, 6 Pa. 70 (Wood-
ward dissenting), 1847 ; Vermont Cent. R. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28
Vt. 193 (855); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. fffcLean County, 17 Ills.
296 (1855) ; Shamokin Valley R. R. v. Zivernore, 47 Pa. 465
(1864) ; Worcester Co. v. W~orcester, 116 Mass. 193 (1874);
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States v. Middle Twp., 38 N. J. L. 270 (1876). While the deci-
sions cited uphold the conclusion reached by the court, cases are
not wanting in which such exemption has been denied; it cannot
be said, therefore, that the exemption is sustained by weight of
authority: Phila. R. R. v. Burgess, 2 Gill (Md.), 355 (1844);
Louisville, etc., Canal Co., v. Com. 7 B. Mon. (Ky.), 16o (1846) ;
Providence R. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I. 439 (1853) ; Marine R. R.
Co. v. Portland, 57 Me. 444 (1854); R. R. v. Connelly, io Ohio,
16o (Sutliff dissenting) (859) ; Burlington R. R. v. Slearman,
12 Ia. 112 (186i); Orange, etc. R. R. Co., v. Alexander, 17
Gratt. (Va.) 176 (1867); Boston R. R. v. Lowell R. R., 124
Mass. 368 (1878); People v. Cornm'rs of Taxes, 82 N. Y. 460
('x88o); P. C. &R . v. Vandyke, 137 Pa. 249 (189o).
EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT. In Clark v. Ligna Iron Co., 81 Fed.
310 (June 1, 1897), the Circuit Court of Appeals has made a very
broad application of the doctrine of equitable assignment. The
Ligna Iron Company, being a debtor to one Clark, and a creditor
of one Vandevort and others of its stockholders, made a contract
with Clark, for a present consideration, to undertake to collect the
amount due by Clark by litigation, if necessary, to be placed in
the hands of Clark's attorney. It was also argued in the contract
that, if any money was collected by the company from Vande-
vort, it should be paid to Clark, and that, if any judgment was
obtained against Vandevort, it should be assigned to Clark on
request.
Clark then appointed an attorney, who brought suit against
Vandevort in the name of the iron company, and obtained a
judgment. At this time the company was placed in the hands of
a receiver, and after that the attorney collected the amount of the
judgment and paid it to Clark. The receiver sued Clark to re-
cover the judgment, and Clark's defence was that the contract
made by the iron company was an equitable assignment of its
,claim against Vandevort. The judgment below was for the
jplaintiff.
The Court of Appeals said that, according to the contract made,
snot a dollar of the claim collected by the judgment was to come
into the company's hands, but that, after the judgment was re-
covered, the plaintiff was bound to assign such judgment to Clark,
.as a mere formal duty to clothe Clark with the legal ownership,
for the equitable ownership already vested in him.
As the judgment was not an asset of the company, it could not
be relieved of its duty to Clark by the appointment of a receiver.
The former English doctrine was that an order payable out of a
particular fund would operate as an assignment of the "fund,
-but that a mere promise to pay out of such a fund would not:
-Bradley's Case, Ridgeway, 194 (1744); Bispham's Equity (Fifth
Edition), pp- 249-50.
This rule has been followed in America: Christmas v. Russell,
NOrMS.
14 Wall. 69 (1871). In that case it was held that a mere prom-
ise, though of the clearest and most solemn kind, to pay a debt out
of a particular fund, is not an assignment of the fund even in equity.
To make an equitable assignment there should be such an actual or
constructive appropriation of the subject-matter as to confer a com-
plete and present right on ihe party meant to be provided for. If
the holder of the fund retain control over it, that is fatal to its being
an equitable assignment.
Christmas v. Russell (supra) has been generally followed in this
country, and the lower court, in the case under discussion, relied
upon it in giving judgment for the plaintiff for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defence. AcCording to the terms of the agreement be-
tween Clark and the iron company, it is a promise to use every
effort to collect the amount due, to let Clark appoint an attorney
to sue, if necessary, and to pay over to Clark all the money collected
by the iron company from its stockholders. The suit is brought
in the name of the promisor, the iron company, and the company
is to collect the judgment by it attorney and pay it to Clark,
and, therefore, the lower court held that the control had not passed
from the company, but that the agreement was purely executory,
as an intention to create a present assignnient could not be in-
ferred from the terms expressed; and, therefore, according to the
rule of Christmas v, Russell (sujra), this was not an equitable as-
signment.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing this decision, seems to have
gone over to the later English doctrine, as expressed in Rodick v.
Gandell, i DeG. M. & 0., 763 (x851), a promise to pay out of
a particular fund does operate as an assignment. The Court of
Appeals says: "As against Vandevort the legal ownership and
right of action had remained in the trustees, but when the right of
action was merged in the judgment-and that, too, by the action
of attorneys of cestui que trust-the iron company was a mere
dry trustee, whose sole remaining duty was to assign such judg-
ment on request," thereby considering that the duty of the iron
company to assign in futuro was sufficient to constitute a valid
present equitable assignment.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS; SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON OFFICER
TEMPORARILY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION. In the case of -Farrell
v. Oregon Gold Mining Co., 49 Pac. 876 (July 31, 1897), the
Supreme Court of Oregon held, that a foreign corporation doing
business in Oregon is subject to its laws, and hence, as there is no
special law relative to service upon it, a service upon its president
is prima facie sufficient, though the return does not show he was
authorized to represent the corporation, in view of the statutes
providing for such service upon domestic corporations.
The question was raised on a motion to vacate a judgment entered
against the defendant corporation by default. It does not appear
whether the corporation was actually doing business in the State
at the time of the service, but the court seems to treat it as a
fact. At any rate, the court disregards the question whether the
president was in the State on the business of the corporation or not,
and seeks to draw an analogy between a domestic and foreign cor-
poration, so far as the president's authority to receive service is
concerned. The principle laid down is rather broader than the
facts of the case warrant.
There is considerable confusion in the law on this question. The
distinction would seem to be, that so long as q corporation confines
its operation to the State within which it is created, it cannot be
sued in a State where it has no office or transacts no business, by
serving process on its president or other officer when accidentally
present within such State: Thompson on Corporations, § 7994;
Moulin v. Trenton Mut., etc., C., 24 N. J. L. 221; Camden
.Rolling Mill Co. v. Swede Iron CO., 32 N. J. L. 15 (1867) ; U. S.
v. American Bell Telephone Co., 29 Fed. i7 (1886). But when a
foreign corporation sends its officers and agents into another State,
and establishes its business there, it is liable to be brought into the
courts of such State by a service of process upon such officers so
acting for it: St. Clairv. Cox, io6U. S. 350 (1882).
Sometimes the amount of business done by a foreign corporation
in a State, where it is sought to be held by service on its president
or other officer, is important: Clews v. Woodstock Iron CO., 44
Fed. 31 (18go).
In some jurisdictions it has been held, that, under various legis-
lative acts, service upon the president or other officer of a foreign
corporation is good even though that officer be in the State tem-
porarily and on no business of the corporation: Pope v. Terre
faute Car Co., 87 N. Y. 137 (1881) ; Hilles v. R. 1?., 70 N. Y.
223 (1877); Iron Co. v. Construction Co., 14 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cases, i6 (Mich., 1886); First Nfat'l Bank v. Burch, 8o Mich.
242 (I89O). In Pennsylvania such service is not good unless the
corporation has an actual place of business within the State:
Phillips v. Library Co., I4i Pa. 462 (1891). See also U. S.
Graphite Co. v. Pacific Co., 68 Fed. 442 (1895). By far the.
greater weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that ser-
vice on an officer of a foreign corporation who is temporarily in
the jurisdiction not on business for the corporation is valid: St.
Clair v. Cox, xo6 U. S. 350 (1882); Fitzgerald, etc., Co. v. Fitz-
.gerald, 137 U. S. 98 (189o) ; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S.
518 (1894) ; -Rust v. Waterworks Co., 7o Fed. 129 (1895) ;
Afiddebroke v. Ins. C., 14 Conn. 301 (1841) ; Zatimer v. R. R.,
43 Mo. 105 (1868) ; Peckham v. North Parish, 16 Pick. 274
(1834); Minnesota v. Imp. Co., 26 Minn. 233 (1879); Ins. Co.
v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 671 (1871); Fox v. Hale, etc., Co., 41 Pac.
308 (Cal., 1895); Gravely v. Southern Ice Mfachine Co., 16 So.
Rep. 866 (Louisiana, 1895).
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